Iran’s leaders are likely to pursue a mix of retaliation abroad, repression at home, and emergency political maneuvering, while trying to avoid complete state collapse or a full regional war.

Quick Scoop: What’s Going On

  • Supreme Leader Khamenei has been killed in a strike, and a provisional leadership council is being formed amid elite infighting and fear of fragmentation.
  • Iran has already fired missiles at Israel and U.S.-linked targets in the Gulf, signaling it wants to show strength quickly.
  • Inside the country, the regime is still facing deep economic crisis and ongoing protest potential after the 2025–2026 unrest.

Likely Things Iran Will Do Next

1. Hit Back, But Try to Control Escalation

You can expect Iran to:

  • Continue missile and drone strikes on U.S. bases, Gulf infrastructure, and possibly Israeli targets, especially in the immediate aftermath of Khamenei’s death, to show it is not broken.
  • Use regional allies (Hezbollah, militias in Iraq/Syria/Yemen) to apply pressure without always acting directly under its own flag, to raise the cost for Washington, Tel Aviv, and Gulf capitals while preserving some deniability.
  • Signal through public statements that any move to “break up” Iran or support secessionist groups will be met with extreme force, framing this as a defense of national unity rather than just regime survival.

But at the same time, Iran’s leadership knows:

  • Its economy is already battered, and a long war with the U.S. and Israel would be devastating, so they are likely to calibrate attacks to hurt—without crossing every U.S. “red line” at once.
  • They will likely look for some off-ramps or indirect channels to test whether Washington is open to a ceasefire or limited de‑escalation once they feel they’ve “restored deterrence.”

2. Crack Down Hard at Home

Historically, when cornered, the Islamic Republic has chosen repression over reform.

Expect:

  • Intensified security clampdowns : more IRGC and Basij in the streets, expanded use of live ammunition in restive provinces, and mass arrests of activists and suspected organizers.
  • Internet and communications blackouts to block organizing and prevent images of unrest from circulating, as seen in the 2025–2026 protests when ATMs, phone lines, and online services were shut down.
  • Aggressive propaganda blaming the U.S., Israel, and “separatists” for any internal protests, both to justify repression and to keep security forces loyal.

However:

  • Economic misery and years of accumulated anger mean protests could reignite rapidly if people feel the regime is vulnerable, especially without Khamenei’s personal authority holding the system together.
  • If security forces—who are also suffering economically—start to crack or refuse orders, the state could face localized breakdowns or defections, something even regime insiders now openly worry about.

3. Fight Over Succession and Regime Shape

Khamenei’s death triggers a dangerous internal transition.

Likely dynamics:

  • A provisional leadership council will try to project unity, but behind closed doors factions (security hardliners, conservative clerics, more pragmatic politicians) will compete over who sets strategy and who becomes the next supreme leader—or whether the role is re‑defined.
  • Some elites may push to shift blame onto others (for example, the president highlighting that real power lies with the supreme leader and security organs), a pattern already visible before this crisis.
  • In the extreme, rival power centers (IRGC commanders, clerical networks, regional bosses) could start acting more autonomously if they think the center is weakening, increasing the risk of fragmentation.

This is why officials are loudly warning against “secessionist factions” and promising harsh punishment.

4. Try to Leverage the International Moment

Iran will also work the diplomatic and informational battlefield:

  • Appeal to Russia, China, and some Global South states to condemn U.S.–Israeli strikes, frame Trump’s campaign to “hit Iran very hard” as illegal aggression, and bring pressure in the UN and other forums.
  • Push narratives that this is not about the regime but about Iranian sovereignty, hoping even some critics at home rally when the country is under foreign attack.
  • Quietly probe whether sanctions relief or nuclear bargaining chips might be back on the table in the medium term, once the immediate military confrontation stabilizes.

At the same time, U.S. “maximum pressure” is effectively back: Trump is openly talking about crippling Iran’s military and urging Iranians to overthrow the clerical system, which narrows space for compromise—at least in the short run.

Possible Scenarios (Speculative, Not Predictions)

  1. Controlled Escalation, Then a Freeze
    • Iran attacks U.S./Israeli/Gulf targets for days or weeks, suffers more strikes in return, then all sides quietly look for a ceasefire once they feel they have “made their point.”
  1. Internal Crack-Up
    • Protests spike, parts of the security forces falter, and local leaders or armed groups challenge Tehran, leading to a messy mix of repression, negotiations, and possible de facto zones of control.
  1. Regime Survives but Hardens
    • The system weathers the immediate storm, installs a successor leadership, and doubles down on domestic control and regional deterrence while remaining economically isolated and unstable.

No one—inside or outside Iran—can say with certainty “what Iran will do,” but all of the above options are shaped by three hard realities: a leadership in survival mode, a society exhausted and angry, and foreign adversaries willing to push much harder than before.

Information gathered from public forums or data available on the internet and portrayed here.